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Abstract
Macroeconometric policy mc~els with a decentralized decision struc-
ture can often be viewed upon as a linear quadratic ~T-person nonzero
sum difference game with exogenous inputs, nonfeasibl~ ideal paths
and a fixed time horizon. When the decision structure is also hierar-
chical, the Stackelberg solution concept can be used to mode~ the
decision structure. In this paper the open loop and feedback Staekel-
berg strategies for such a game are derived.
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1. Introduction
Macroeconometric policy models with a decentralized decision struc-
ture can often be converted into a linear quadratic nonzero sum dif-
ference game with exogenous inputs, nonfeasible ideal paths and a
fixed time horizon (see [ 1] ).
The formal framework for this game in terms of general syetems
theory can be found in [ 2] .
When it is assumed that the players have a competitive mood of play
and expect rational behaviour óf the other players, the Nash solution
concept can be used to model the decision structure ([1]).
When it is assumed that the players have a cooperative mood of play,
Pareto is the appropriate so?ution concept ([2]).
When some players are dominated by others, either due to a lack of
information about the performa.nce functionals of other players or
due to differences in size or strength, the Stackelberg solution
concept can be used. This concept presupposes a leader-follower
decision structure and rational behaviour of the followers.
The main ideas for this paper stem from [ 3] and [ 4] .
The references [ 6] ,[ 7] and [ 8] can also be clarifying.
A survey of results for the Stackelberg solution concept can be found
in [ 5] .
2. Definition and Example.
When the players in a game ar.nounce their strategies one after
another, we call their optimal strategies the Stackelberg solution
for the game. This solution concept comes to mind, when we want
to model the decision strticture in a game as being hierarchical or
sequential, having a leader-Pollower structure in some sense. It
is assumed, that every player expects his followers to behave
rationally.
Suppose we have an N-player game, where player N is the leader and
where players N-1 to 1 follow one after another. Let U,~ to UN be the sets- 3 -
of admissable strategies for player 1 to N, respectively, and let
Ji ; U1 x U2 x... x UN -'IRt, i- 1,2, ... , N,
be the cost functionals, that players 1 to N, respectively, want
to minimize. Stackelberg solutions for this game can be de~ined as
follows.
Definition:
If there exist mappings Ti : Uitl x Uit2
x... x UN -} Ui,
i- 1,2, ... , N-1, such that for any fixed
~~tl'uit2'
..., uN) E Uitl x Uit2
x... x UN
1) (ul'u2'" 'ui-1'Ti((uitl'uit2~..,uN)),uitl,uit2~.., uN)E Di-1
ii) Ji((~ul,u2,..,ui-1'Ti((uitl'uit2'..,uN)),uitl'`xit2y..,u~)) ~




and if there exists a(ul,u2,..,uN)E DN-1, such tkiat
JN((ul,u2,..,~)) ~ JN((ul,u2,.-,uN)) for all ( 1~1,tL2,..,uN)E DN-1
then (u1,u2,..,uN) is called a Stackelberg solution for the
game.
In the case of two players we can immediately cunclude from
this definition and from the definition of a Nash solution
(see e.g. [1]), that, because Nas.h solutions belcng to D~,
Stackelberg solutions are favourable to the leader as compared
to Nash solutions ( see also [ 6] ).- ~ -
To find a Stackelberg solution for the game we proceed, according to
the definition, as follows. At first we express the rational behaviour
of player 1. Given this rational behaviour, we look for the rational
behaviour of player 2 and so on until we can solve for the optimal stra-
tegy of player N, the leader.
To illustrate the concept of a Stackelberg solution we use the famous
two person nonzero sum static game, represented by figure (a).
Figure a)
On the axes we find the admissable strategies for playcr 1 and 2, res-
pectively.
The curves are isocost contours.
The lines xx and yy are rational behaviour lines for player 1 and 2,
respectively.
The Nash solution N is the intersection of th~ lines xx and yy.- 5 -
The Pareto set of noninferior solutions (see e.g. [2]) is given by the
dark line connecting O1 and 02.
The shaded area represents the set of solutions that are favourable
to both players as compared to the Nash solution.
The Stackelberg solution S2 for the game with player 2 as .leader is the
tangent point of the line xx with the set of isocost cont~urs for player
2. Similarly, the Stackelberg solution S1 for the game with playep 1 as
leader is the tangent point of the line yy with the set ~f isocost con-
toa.~~ f~,r player 1.
Nate that both S~ and S2 are on a lower cost eontour than N, when we -
consider the leader of the game. Interesting is, that S1 lies in the
shaded area, which means that the follower has also low~r costa than in
N, whereas S2 lies outside the shaded area, which means that the follower
is worse off than in N.
Other examples can be found in [ 6] ,[ 7] and [ 8] .
3. The Model.
We consider a macroeconometric policy model with N policy makers. The
objectives of these policy makers are assumed to be in the form of N
quadratic cost functionals J1, J 2,.., J N, that weigh devis.tions of ob-
jective variables and controlvariables from ideal paths, set by the
different policy makers, and sum those costs over a plar,n?.ng period.
All the policy makers have the same view of reality; that is all the
cost functionals are constrained by the same model. This aodel is convRr-
ted into a system in state space form. For mathematical reasons the
system equations have to be linearized in the state variables and the
controlvariables. Econometric models are mostly specified in diacrete
time, so the time parameter is discrete. Some exogenoua inputscenarios
influence the system. The ideal paths generally do not form a solution
for the system equations.
The N policy makers are not equally powerful: we assume a deCision hieTar-
chy. The strategies are chosen one after another. To be a~le to select an
optimal strategy, each player must have an expectation ~f the behaviour
of his followers: rational behaviour is assumed.A model like this is called a linear quadratic nonzero sum difference
game with exogenous inputs, nonfeasible ideal paths and a fixed time
horizon, subject to the Stackelberg solution concept.
Formally:
Ji(xo,ul(.)~u2(.)...,uN(.)) -
- Ef ~IY(t)-Y.(t)l'Q.(t)IY(t)-Y.(t)]tt~-1 E ~Iuj(t)-uj(t)]'Rij(t)Iuj(t)-uj(t)l t-to i i i
t-to j-1
i- 1,2,..,N,






x(.) are the state variables,
ui(.) are the controlvariables,
y(.) are the objective variables,
zl(.) and z2(.) are the exogenou: variables,
n n
yi(.) and ui(.) are the ideal paths for the objective variables and
controlvariables, respectively, ~et by player i,
Qi(.) : (mxm) matrix,
Rij(.) : (sixsi) matrix,- 7
A(.) : (nxn) matrix,
Bi(.): (nxsi) matrix,
C(.) : (nxrl) matrix,
F(.) : (mxn) matrix,
G(.) : (,mxr2) matrix.
It is natural to assume the matrices Qi(.) and Ri~(.) tu be positive
semi-definite. To avoid singularities we assume the matrices Rii(.) to
be positive definite.
Without loss of generality we assume the matrices Qi(.) and Ri~(.) to
be symmetric.
Player N selects his strategy first, then player N-1, and so on.
4. The Principle of Optimality.
It is important to check , whether the Stackelberg solution concept
satisfies Bellman's principle of optimality, because, if it is satisfied,
we can apply the dynamic programming technique to find a(closed loop
no memory) solution for the game.
The principle of optimality states, that an optimal strategy for the
problem starting in xo at to must have the property, that the part of
the strategy, that remains after having applied it some time steps, is
also optimal for the problem starting in the state reached at that point
in time.
The Stackelberg solution does not satisfy the principle of optimality.
We will show, why this is the case for the model described above, and
we will give a numerical example.
The rational behaviour of player 1 can be found by solvirg a standard
optimal control problem, because we can consider the strategies of











Observe, that we don't have a~ystem anymore, because the axiom of
determinism or the non-anticipf.tivity is no longer satisfied. It is











The rational behaviour of player 1 can be expressed as
ul(to)--~(xotu2(tl))





Open loop solution: u2(tl)5 x0'
Linear closed loop no memory solution: u2(tl)a~x~(tl).
Both solutions give rise to the same trajectories and the same costs.
So, the open loop Stackelberg solution becomes
ui (to)--5o,u2(tl)5xo





Whereas~ starting in 5o at tl (in fact not a game situation anymore),
the optimal strategy is u2(tl)-0.
So, the principle of optimality isn't satisfied.
A"tree"-example can be found in [7].
The solution, that is found by means of dynamic programming, is called- 10 -
the feedback Stackelberg solution.
The interpretation of this solution is, that in this case each player
waits with announcing his action until he makes observations about
the state of the system, that is realized. In the closed loop no memo-
ry solution each player announces at the beginning of the planning
period, for each point in tim~, how he will react to his observations
about the state of the system, he selects from all functions of obser-
vations and time.
In the feedback solution each player announces at each point in time,
how he reacts to his observations about the state of the system, that
is realized at that point in time: in fact the principle of optimali-
ty is postulated.
In the closed loop no memory solution a player can reach lower costs
than in the feedback solution by announcing a strategy, that is on the
one hand suboptimal for him for the last part of the game, but on the
other hand such that his follower~ while minimizing their own costs,
will choose strategies, that lead to trajectories, that are so much
better for him for the first part of the game, as compared to the feed-
back solution, that the losses in the last part of the game are more than
compensáted. But the closed loop no memory solution is not stable in
the sense that the followers can't be sure, that the leaders will
stick to their announced strategies, when the game gets to the
stage, where those strategies are inferior to them. Whether the
leaders will keep their (suboFtimal) "threats", depends on how they
weigh the actual costs by their credibility in the future.
For the feedback Stackelberg solution it isn't true anymore in general,
that the leader in the two person game has lower costs than be would
have had in the feedback Nash s~lution: a"tree"-example can be
found in [ 71 .
In the next paragraphs we will present results on the open loop Stackel-
berg solution, where each player announces at the beginning of the
planning period a.strategy, which only depends on the initial state
of the system and time, and results on the feedback Stackelberg solution
for the model, described in paragraph 3. The closed loop Stackelberg
solution is still a topic of fLrther research; in [9] it is shown,- 11 -
that the closed loop no memory Stackelberg strategies in this deter-
ministic setting are not linear.
5. Open Loo Stackelberg Solution.
We start with some remarks on the nature of the problem, When we solve
for the rational behaviour of player 1, a standard optimal control pro-
blem, and substitute this rational behaviour in the system equations
a;;d in the cost functionals for the other players, we ~nd up with cost
functionals for the other players, system equations, backward recur-
sive matrix Riccati equations and backward recursive trecking equations,
driven by the strategies of the other players ( a system:), with a fixed
boundary condition at the time horizon.
When we eliminate player 1, using the necessary conditicns for his
rational behaviour according to Pontryagin's minimum principle, we
end up with: cost functionals for the other players, system equations
and adjoint system equations, with a boundary condition on state and
adjoint state at the time horizon.
Both situations can be viewed upon as the same problem as the original
one with one player less, but constrained by a system ~ith a dimension,
twice as big as the dimension of the original system, a.nd with mixed
boundary conditions. To eliminate player 2 we have to solve this two
point boundary value optimal control problem. Again we can choose
between techniques, based on the "completion of the squere" argument,
and Portryagin's minimum principle (see e.g. [2]).
In the same way the other pla,yers can successively be eliminated.
This leads to a sequence Pi,i-2,3,..,N, of two point roundary value
optimal control problems.
The open loop Stackelberg solution follows directly fron, the solution
of PN, the optimal control problem for the leader. The solution of
PN can be found by solving a backward recursive matrix Riccati equation
and a backward recursive tracking equation.
The technique we use in this paper is successive application of Pontry-
agin's minimum principle.- 12 -
In theorem 1 we state and prove, under the assumption that (ItA)-1
exists, how the sequence Pi,i-1,2,..,N, is formed. Implicitly one
finds the rational behaviour ~f the followers in terms of adjoint varia-
bles. We will use the symbols p,y and q for the adjoint variables,
that show up as a consequence of the elimination process. In theorem
2 we state and prove, which Riccati equation and tracking equation
have to be solved to find a solution for PN and how the open loop
Stackelberg solution relates to the solution of PN.
Notation: for notational convenience we won't write the time dependen-
cy of the matrices.
Theorem 1-
Assuming that (ItA) is nonsing,ilar, the successive elimination of fol-
lowers in the N-level Stackelberg linear quadratic difference game
with an open loop information structure by means of successive appli-







~[ Y(t )-Yl(t )] ' Q1I Y(t )-Yl(t )] t
tf -1 N
t E E ~[u.(t)-u.(t)]'R [u.(t)-u.(t)],
t-t~j-1 J J lj J J
sub.j ect to
x(ttl)-x(t)-Ax(t)t E Bj(uj(t)-uj(t))t L Bju~(t)t cz1(t),
J-1 J-1
x(to)-xo







i - ~ z[Y(t)-Yi(t)]'Qi[Y(t)-Yi(t)]t
t-t
0
t Ef-~ E ~[uj(t)-u~(t)]'Rij[u~(t)-uj(t)]
t-to j-1
sab,ject to
a system, consisting of (21-2:~n) dimensional forward



















are exogenous to Pi,i-1,2,..,N.





: n : ((21-2-2J-2-1)im)
for t-to,tofl,....,tf -~
X2(.)~ X(.),











(V) v2(.) o E Bj(uj(.)-uj(.))f r Bjuj(.)tcZl(.),
j-2 j -1
N1Bj(uj(.)-uj(.))t E Bjuj(.)tc ~(.)
j-1











( ( 2i-3-1)~en )- ~5 -







n ( ( 2i-3-1)~en )
0 0 ((21-3-1)ien)
and




I-U. ' ~ ( pl-3~
) L i-1 -Si-1




















i-1 -Qi-1 (2 ~)
( 2i-3ien ) ( 2i-3i~n )
0 ~ ((2i-3-1)tn)
n ( ( 2i-3-1)ien )
Proof:
P1 is immediately clear.
P2 up to PN we show by induction.
a) P2 is found by stating the necessary conditions for the solution
of P1, according to Pontry~,gin's minimum principle. These condi-
tions express the rational behaviour of player 1. These conditions
are:





(5.5) R11(u~(t)-ul(t))tBi pl(tfl)-o,t-to,totl,..,tf -1.
l.x( to )-xo'
i-3,~,..,N,
~ Qi-1F 0 n
~-1 J J J ~-1 J J 1 '
t-to,totl,...,tf,-1,
~pl(t)-p1(ttl)-F'Q1(Fx(t)tGz2(t)-yl(t))tA'pl(tfl),- 17 -
Now we substitute (5.5) into (5.3). It is easily checked, that thie
leads to the required form for P2.
b) Pitl is found by stating the necessary condition~ for the solu-
tion of Pi, according to Pontryagin's minimum pri~ciple. These
conditions express the rational behaviour of player i.
First we make some preliminary steps.
Step 1: we write the constraints of Pi as a system with mixed
boundary conditions by writing the backward recursive
equations as forward recursive equations.
(5.6) pi(ttl)-(ItAi)-1(pi(t)-~iXi(t)-wi(t))~t-to,totl,..~tf-1.
This leads to the system
X. X. A. O S. . ~ . ~ -Q. . I~ X.
(5.7) H1 (ttl.)- 1( t)-( 1 t 1(ItÁi~)-1 i. ) Ni (t)-
pi pi o-I I p,
i
i vi(t)
- (ItAi~)-lwl(t)t ~t-to,totl,... tf1 ~ ,
0


















(viii) and (ix).- ~8 -
.l tf














n ~ t E (u~(t)-u~(t)) Rl~(u~(t)-u~(t))}.
,j-it1
Step 1 and step 2 only consisted of rewriting problem P..
i
We proceed with stating the Hamiltonian functional for P. and i
with stating the necessary conditions for the solution of P..
i
Step 3: we define the Hamiltonien functional Hi, using (5.6).








( IfA ~ ) -1
~ -Q1 ÏI)
i )
N N s. Ei(ui-ui(t)) E B.(u.(t)-u.(t))t E B.u.(t)tcZ (t) 1(I~á ')-lwl(t) t o t j-if1 ~ J ~ o.7-1 ~ J 1 }
I ó '
ó- 19 -
Step ~: according to Pontryagin's minimum principle there exist
r~ ~~ ~
[Pi:qí:yi](t)~t-to,totl,..tf,ao and al~
such that the following equations are satisfied ( see e.q. [10]):





~i(t)--Riibipi(ttl)tui(t)~t-to,totl,..,tf - 1 (5.10)































(ttl)- - (t,zi(t),Pi(t),ui(t),p i(ttl),qi(ttl)~yi(ttl)) x
a I Xi~





















P. P- ~ P-

















from (5.12) and ( 5.13) we find
(5.17) Yi(to)-o
and
F'Q.(Gz (t ) y.(t ))
(5.18) pll (tf) --QiYi(tf)tVixi(tf)t
i 2o f i f
ql~ o .
Now we substitute (5.10) into vi(t) and regroup the fo~-ward recursive
equations (5.1),(5.16) and (5.17) as well as the backirard recursive
equations (5.2),(5.15) and (5.18). It is easily checkF3, that this
leads to the required form for Pit1,Q.E.D.
Theorem 2:
The N-level Stackelherg solution for the linear qixadratic differenee

























xNtl(')'v Ntl(')'wNtl(')'~tl'SNtland QNtl are defined in the same
way as xi(.),vi(,),wi(.),Ái,Si and Qi for i-3,~,..N in theorem l.
Proof:
From theorem 1 we know, that we can find the N-level Stackelberg
solution for the linear quadratic difference game with an open
loop information structure by solving PN, the optimal control pro-
blem for the leader. We can áo this by following the same reasoning
as for Pi in part (b) of the proof of theorem 1. This leads to the
open loop Stackelberg solution
t-tf 1 ,tf2.,...,totl- 23 -
u~(t) - I-R11 B1;o...o]PNt1(tt1)tu~(t),
(5.23) n:((2N-~-1)~tn)
u~(t)-lo...o.-RJJB~:o...o)PNtl(ttl)fu~(t)~J-2,3~..~h~
(2J-2tn);n :((2N-1-2J-2-1)xn) t-to,totl,...,tf 1
where
~~tl(.) is defined in the same way as pi(.) for i-3,4,..,N in
': h~-orem 1
and








This two point boundary value problem can be solved in the usuel way
by postulating the linear relationship
~rrtl(t)-x(t)~tl(t)tg(t),t-to,totl,...,tf-
~I i tl(tf)-,TltlXntl(tf)~Ntl(tf)'
The recursive equations ('S.20),(5.21) and (5.22) folluw immediately.
Q.E.D.
Remarks:
1) The costs can immediately be calculated from the cos`c functionals,
taking into account that
Y(t)-~F;o..o]xN}1(t)tGz2(t)~t-to,totl,...,tf.
n :((2N-1-1)~n)-24-
2) It is not clear directly under which conditions in terms of the
data of the game the matrices
(I-SNt1K(.)) are nonsingular, although
we can prove in an indirect way, that the open loop Stackelberg
solution exists(and is unique) under the conditions, that Qi(.) and
Ri~(.) are positive semi-definite and Rii(.) are positive definite.
In section 6 of this paper we show, that the feedback Stackelberg
solution exists (and is unique)under those conditions.
Furthermore we use the fact, tY,at for a one stage problem the open
loop solution and the feed~ack solution are identical. We can trans-
form our problem into a one stage problem by defining (see e.g. ~8j)
x(1)a(xr(totl)x~(tot2)....x~(tf)]~
x(o)~[x~ x.~....x~j ~ - - o 0 0
ui(o)~[ui(to)ui(totl)...ui(tf 1)]~,i-1,2,..,N,etc....
The cost matrices for this one stage problem are
Qi(o)~ diag ( Qi(to),o,...,o)
e,i(1)a aiag (Qi(totl),Qi(tot2),...,Qi(tf))
Ri~(o)~ diag (Ri.7(to),Ri~(totl),...,Ri~(tf1))
Finally we note, that Qi(.) s.nd Ri~(o) ~e positive semi-definite,
if Qi(,) and Ri~(.) are positive semi-definite,and that Rii(o) is
positive definite, if R..(.) are positive definite. ii
The method described here is not attractive, if the planning period
is long, because in that case the dimensions of the problem become
very big.
Fxample :
We will elucidate theorem 1 and theorem 2 by means of a simple two
stage two person nonzero sum linear quadratic difference game.
The open loop Stackelberg solution for this game was also calculated-25-

















- ~ -~ ~ v30~
0 0 ~o ~] [o ~,
4 0 4 0 0 0
Q3(2)- 2-~ ; Q3(1)- 2-~ ; Q3(o)-
Lo o] ~
w30.
From (5.21) ve find
4 0 26~5 k~5
K(2)- ; K(1)-
2 -4 11~5 -26~
Fron (5.22} ve find g(2)-o;g(1)-o.
From (5.20) ve find
36~145 x 13~145 x
x(o}- xo ; a(1}- o; z(2)- o 3 0 3 u~1~5 xo 3 8j1~5 x~From (5.19) we find the open loop Stackelberg solution
ul(o)- -~ xo;ul(1)--165 xo;
u2(o)--1~5 xo ;u2(1)- 145 xo.
6. Feedback Stackelberg Solution.
The feedback Stackelberg solution is by definition the sólution
for the game, that is found by means of dynamic programming.
As always, when we apply dynamic programming in linear quadratic
frameworks, we have quadratic value functions for all players and
we will operate on the backward recursive equations for those value
functions.
Notation: for notational convenience we won't write the time depen-
dency of the data-matrices.





t E z[uj(t)-uj(t)] ~~ij[uj(t)-uj(t)]t
j-1




The optimal behaviour of player i,i-1,2,...,N, at time t can be found
by differentiating the right hand side of (6.1) with respect to
ui(t) and setting this derivative equal to zero. In remark 2 at
page 37 we show, that the Hessian matrix is positive definite (becausewe assumed the matrices Qi and Rij to be positive semi-definite and
the matrices R.. to be positive definite), so that the
ii
u,(.),i-1,2,..,N, calculated according to the described procedure,
i
will indeed minimize the cost functionals. Remember, that the
Stackelberg solution concept presupposes, that the decision of
player i,i-1,2,..,N-1, depends on the decisions of the players higher
in the hierarchy, that is the players itl up to N.
To solve for the optimal behaviour of player i,i-1,2..,N, we define
the quadratic value functions as follows:
~ ~
~~~y(tex)-zx Ki(t)Xtgi(t)xtci(t)~t-t~,tptl,..,tf„1-1,2,..,N.
Without loss of generality we assume the K- matrices to be symmetric.
The descríbed procedure, that is the equalizing of the gradients with
respect to u.(t) of the right hand sides of (6.1) with zero, leads
i





t E B.í~.(t)tCz (t))tg (ttl))-o (6.3)
J J j-1
and
i-1 au.(t) , i-1 au.(t) ,
Rii[ui(t)-ui(t)lt E(au,(t) ) Rij[uj(t)-uj(t)]~(Bit É au(t) ~j).
j-1 i j-1 i
N ~ N ~




Notation: the sum-term E and the product-term II should be under-
stood as follows:
if the index is nondecreasing, as normal, and if the index is
decreasing, E- o and n- I.
Theorem 3:
The set of equations (ó.3) and (6.~) have the following solution:-28-
ui(t)--Di(t)((ItA)x} E Bj[uj(t)-uj(t)]f E Bjuj(t)tcZl(t))t
j-it1 j-1
N
t E (-D1R)(t))SR(ttl)tui(t),i-1,2,..,N,t-to,totl,..,tf 1 (6.5)
~-1
where





~ i-1 i-1 , ,
Di(t)-Mil(t)Bi{ E ( II (I-BkDk(t))) Dj(t)Rij~
j-1 k-jt1
i-1




t( N(I-B D.(t))) K.(ttl)( II(I-B D(t)))} (6.8) k-1 k k i k-1 k k
DiR)(t)-Mil(t)Bi{ lEl(lIIl (I-BkDk(t))i1-Dj(t)Rij.
j-1 k-j}1
(2) i-1 m-1 (~,)
.(D. (t)-D.(t) L ( II (I-B D (t)))B D (t))t
~ ~ m-jtl k~jtl




i-1 m-1 ( ~, )
.( E ( II (I-BkDk(t)))(-BmDm (t)))},
m-1 k-1
Q-1,2,...,i-1
(i) 1 , i-1 ,







, i-1 i-1 , ,
Mi(t)-RiitBi { E ( R (I-BkDk(t))) Dj(t)Rij.
j-1 k-jt1
i-1
.D.(t)( n (I-B D (t)))t
J k-jt1 k k
(6.11)
i-1 , i-1
t( II(I-BkDk(t))) Ki(ttl)( n(I-BKDk(t)))} Bi (6.12)
k-1 k-1
for i-2,3,..,N, t-to,totl,...,tf -1




a) I- E Pi( n (I-Pk))- R(I-Pk)
i-~ k-itl k-j
n n k-1 n k-1
b) ï{Pi-Pi E ( II (I-PR))Pk}- E( n(I-PQ))Pk
i-,7 k-it1 k-it1 k-j R-j
Proof:
n n










n n n k-1
E P.- E P. E ( II (I-P ))P -
i-j 1 i-j 1 k-it1 k-it1 Q k
n n k-1 k-1
- E Pi- E E Pi ( n ( I-PQ ))Pk -
i-J k-jtl i-J R-it1
n k-1 k-1
- P.t E (I- E P.( II (I-P )))P
J k-jt1 i-j 1 R-it1 ~ k-








For j-2,3,..,N,t-to,totl,..,tf-1 we have:
suppose, that (6.5) is corrFct for i-1,2,..,j-1, then
au.(t) , j-1 , ~
-~ B ( n (I-B D (t))) D,(t),i-1,2,..,j-1 (6.13) auj(t) - j k-it1 k k 1
Proof:





2) Suppose, that (6.13)is correct for i-j-l,j-2,..,kt1
auR t) J-1 aui(t) , , ,
i-u,:au~ -(lERtl(auJ(t))LitB~) r,R(t)-
(6.5)- 31 -
j-1 r j-~- r r r r r
- -( E (-B.( n (z-B D (t))) D.(t))B.tB.)D (t)-
fi i-Rf1 Jk-it1 k k i i J R
induction
assumption
r J-1 J-1 r r r r
- -B.(I- E ( II (I-B D (t))) D. (t)B.jD (t)~
J i-R,t1 k-it1
k k i i E
r J-1 r r
- -B.( n (I-B D (t))) D (t).




For j-2,3,..,Ntl,t-to,to}1,..,t~-1 we have:





.((ItA)xf E Bm[umt)~zm(t)]f E ~mum(t)iCzl(t))f
m-J m-1
N ( Q 1 j-1 m-1 (~ )




We prove this by backward induction.
1) i-j-1: (6.5) immediately implies (6.14).
2) Suppose, that ( 6.1~) is correct for i-j-l,j-2,..,nt1;
(6.14)
i-n:- 32 -




tczl(t)) f E (-Dn~ )(t) )BR(ttl)-
~-1
j-1 j-1




.((IfA)xt REJBR[uR(t)-uR(t)] t RE1BRuR(t)}cZl(t))t
N ~ j-1 i-1 ~
t E (-DmR~(t }tDm(t) E ( n (I-BkDk(t)))BiDiR'(t))SR(ttt)}t
1t-1 i-mtl k-mt1
N N N
t E Bm[um(t)-um(t)]} E Bmum(t)fczl(t))t REi(-DnR)(t))BR(tt1)-
m-j m-1
j-1 j-1
--D (t){I- E B D (t)( B ( I-BkDk(t)))},
n m-nfl m m k-mf1
.((Ifa)xt E ~Q[ uR(t)-uR(t))t E BRu~t)tcZl(t))t
1C-j R-1
N (R,) j-1 (R)
t i {-D (t)tJ (t)( E (B D (t)-
R-1 n n m-nt1 m m
j-1 i-1 (R)
-BmDm(t) E ( II (I-BkDk(t)))BiDi (t)))} gR(ttl).
i-mt1 k-mt1
From this, lemma la and lemma lb, (6.1k) for i-n is immediately
clear.
Q.E.D.-33-
Now we are ready tc prove theorem 3.
Proof theorem 3:
We prove this by induction.
1) We rewrite ( 6.3) as follows:
ul(t)--(R11tB1K1(ttl)Bl)-1B1(Kl(ttl)((ItA)xt
N N
t E Bj[uj(t)-uj(t)It E Bjuj(t)tcZl(t))tal(ttl))tul(t),
j-2 j-1
t-to,totl,..tf 1.
From this, (6.5) for i-1, (6.6) and (6.7) are immediately clear.
2) Suppose, that the solution of (6.3) and (6.~) for i-1,2,..,j-1 is
given by (6.5) up to (6.12) for i-1,2,..,j-1, then, using lemm~, 2
and lemma 3, we can rewrite (6.4) for i-j as Pollows:
Rjjluj(t)-uj(t)}tJEl{-Bj(JII1 (T-BkDk(t)))~-Di(t)}R`l.
i-1 k-it1




N (R) j-1 m-1 (JC)
t E(-D. (t)tD.(t) E ( n (I-B D(t)))B D(t))g (ttl)}t
R-1 1 1 m-it1 k-it1
k k m m R
1
t(B~tJE {-B~(Jnl ( I-g D (t)))~D~(t)}B~).
~ i-1 ~ k-it1
k k 1 1
j-1 j-1
.(K.(ttl)((ItA)xt E B.{-D.(t)( n ( I-B D (t))).
~ i-1 1 1 k-it1
k k-3~-
.((ItA)xtmEJBmlum(t)-um(t)jt mElBmum(t)tCzl(t))t
N (R) j-1 m-1 (R)
t E(-D. (t)tD.(t) E ( II (I-B D(t)))B D (t))g (tfl)}t
1L-1 1 1 m-if1 k-it1
k k m m R
t E Bi[ui(t)-ui(t)]t E Biu~(t)tCzl(t))t8j(ttl))-o,
i-j i-1
t-to~totl,..,tf-1.
From lemma la we know, that
B~(I-JEl(Jnl ( I-R~ D (t))1~D~(t)B~)-




From lemma lb we know, that
j-1 (R) j-1 m-1
E {-BiDi (t)fBiDi(t) E ( II (I-BkDk(t)))BmDmR)(t)}~
i-1 m-it1 k-it1
j-1 m-1 (R)
- E ( II (I-BkDk(t)))(-BmDm (t)~t-to,totl,..,tf1.
m-1 k-1
Now it is easy to derive (6.5) and (6.8) up to (6.12) for i-j.
Q.E.D.
In fact we have found in theorem 3 the feedback Stackelberg solu-
tion in terms of Ki(.) and gi(.),i-1,2,..,N.
In theorem 4 we will state and prove backward recursive equations
for Ki(,) and gi(.),i-1,2,..,N.-35-
Theorem 4:
The feedback Stackelberg solution is given by (6.5) up to (6.12),
if Ki(.),i-1,2,..,N, satisfies the backward recursive matrix
Riccati equations
N N
Ki(t)-F~QiFt(IfA) ~{ E ( II ( I-BkDk(t))) ~D~(t)Rij.
j -1 k-j tl
N N
.Dj(t)( II (I-BkDk(t)))t( II (I-BkDk(t)?)~Ki(ttl).
k-jtl k-1
N
.( II (I-BkDk(t)))}(ItA)~t-tf1 ,tf2 D...~tofl (6.15)
k-1
Ki(tf)-F'QiF (6.16)
ar.d gi(.),i-1,2,..,N,satisfies the backward recursive tracking
equations
Bi ( t )-F ~Qi (Gz2( t ) -Yi ( t) }f( ItA ` ) .
N N ~ ~ N




t E(D~~)(t)-D.(t) E(mIIl (I-B D(t)))B D(~}(t)) (ttl))t
Q-1 ~ ~ m-jt1 k-jf1
k k m m ~
N
t( II (I-BkDk(t)))1(Ki(ttl)(( II (I-BkDk(t)})(JE1Bjuj(t)tczl(t))t
k-1 k-1-36-
N N :m-1 (k)







Remember, that we had the quadratic value functions
Vi(t;x)-~x~Ki(t)xtgi(t)xfci(t),t-to,totl,..,tf,i-1,2,..,N.
Now (6.2) immediately implies (6.16) and (6.18).
From (6.1), theorem 3 and iemma 3 for j-Nt1 we know
~x~xi(t)x~iit)xtci(t)-~JE1[ uj(t)-uj(t)] ~Rij[ uj(t)-uj(t)] t
t~[FxtGz2(t)-yi(t)] ~Qi[FxtGz2(t)-yi(t)]t
N N










u.(t)-u.(t)--D.(t)( n (z-B n (t))X(ItA)xt E B.u.(t)tcz (t))t
J J J k-jt1 k k J-1 J J 1-37-
N (JC) N m-1 (k)
t E(-D. (t)}D.(t) E ( II (~ BkDk(t)))BmDm (t))BR(ttl).
Q-1 J J m-Jt1 k-jt1
Comparing quadratic terms in x and linear terms in x leads to
(6.15) and (6.17), respectively, using lemma la and lPmma lb in the
same way as in the proof of theorem 3.
Q.E.D.
Rer.iarks :
1) If one is interested in the costs of the game, one sh~uld also eva-
luate the constant terms ci(.),i-1,2,..,N.
2) By inductive reasoning we can show, that the Hessian matrices
(R11tB1Kl(.)B1) in (6.6) and Mi(.),i-2,3,..,N, in (6.12) are positive
definite, hence nonsingular, so that minimum costs, Di(.) and
Ki(.),i-1,2,..,N, exist.
First we note from (6.16), that Ki(tf) are positive semi-definite,
because Qi are positive semi-definite.
Next we will describe the induction steps in t and i.
Suppose Ki(ttl) are positive semi-definite. Because Rij are positive
semi-definite and R.. are positive definite, we can conclude, that
, ii
a) (R11tBiK1(ttl)B1) is positive definite, so that from (6.6) and
(6.7) D1(t) exists,
b) if Di(t), i-1,2,..,j-l, exist, then from (6.12) Mj(t) is positive
definite, so that from (6.8) Dj(t) exists.
From (6.15) we note, that, if Di(t), i-1,2,..N, exist, then Ki(t)
are positive semi-definite, because Qi, Rij and Ki(ttl) are positive
semi-definite. Q.E.D.
3) The system, driven by the feedback Stackelberg soluticn, can be
written as follows, using lemma 3 for j-Nt1 and lemma la:
N N
x(ttl k(II (I-BkDk(t)))((ItA)x(t)t E Bjuj(t)tCzl(t)),t-to,totl,..tf 1
k-1 j-1
x(to)-xo-38-
4) The algorithm for the feedback Stackelberg solution has a loop back-
ward in time, consisting of the equations (6.15) up to (6.18) and
(6.6) up to (6.12), and a loop forward in time, consisting of (6.5)
and the system equations.
Example:
We will elucidate theorem 3 and theorem 4 by means oP the same example
as was used on page 24.
First we note from (6.17) and (6.18), that gl(2)-g2(2)-g1(1)ag2(1)~0.
So, it is of no use to calculate D~R)(t),i-1,2,R~1,2,t-0,1.
i
From ( 6.16) we find
K1(2)-4;K2(2)-2.
From ( 6.6)and ( 6.7) we find D1(1) 3.
From (6.12) we find M2(1)9.
From ( 6.8) we find D2(1) 10
From (6.15) we find
K1(1) 2~;K2(1)r.
127
From ( 6.6) and ( 6.7) we find D1(o) - i77.
From ( 6.12) we find M(o) 6~ 2 31329'
From ( 6.8) we find D2(o)-3~9.
From (6.5) and the system equations we find the feedback Stackelbera
solution
u2(o)- - 3~9xo;u1(o)- - 34079 0~-39-
u2(1)- - 8~79xo;u1(1)- -
34o79xo'
with trajectory xo, 8~o79xo' 3~xo~
8. Conclusion.
In this paper solutions are derived for the N-level Sts.ckelberg
lin~ar quadratic difference game with exogenous inputs~ nonfeasible
iutal paths and a fixed time horizon for two information structures.
A topic of further research could be the closed loop information
structures for this game. In a second paper on this subject we will
consider more players on the same decision level an~ we will give
an application in the form of a small linked econometric model for
the Common Market.
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